beagleman
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So they showed the inspectors legitimate material then built with a cheaper one that was dangerous?
-
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Grenfell, corporate manslaughter suspected.
- Thread starter raefil
- Start date
So they showed the inspectors legitimate material then built with a cheaper one that was dangerous?
- Joined
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It seems that way, yes.
- Joined
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A section from the report
Part 3
The testing and marketing of products (Chapters 15 – 29)
2.19 One very significant reason why Grenfell Tower came to be clad in combustible materials
was systematic dishonesty on the part of those who made and sold the rainscreen cladding
panels and insulation products. They engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to
manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market. In the
case of the principal insulation product used on Grenfell Tower, Celotex RS5000, the
Building Research Establishment (BRE) was complicit in that strategy.
2.20 Those strategies succeeded partly because the certification bodies that provided assurance
to the market of the quality and characteristics of the products, the British Board of
Agrément (BBA) and Local Authority Building Control (LABC), failed to ensure that the
statements in their product certificates were accurate and based on test evidence.
UKAS, the body charged with oversight of the certification bodies, failed to apply proper
standards of monitoring and supervision.
Part 3
The testing and marketing of products (Chapters 15 – 29)
2.19 One very significant reason why Grenfell Tower came to be clad in combustible materials
was systematic dishonesty on the part of those who made and sold the rainscreen cladding
panels and insulation products. They engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to
manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market. In the
case of the principal insulation product used on Grenfell Tower, Celotex RS5000, the
Building Research Establishment (BRE) was complicit in that strategy.
2.20 Those strategies succeeded partly because the certification bodies that provided assurance
to the market of the quality and characteristics of the products, the British Board of
Agrément (BBA) and Local Authority Building Control (LABC), failed to ensure that the
statements in their product certificates were accurate and based on test evidence.
UKAS, the body charged with oversight of the certification bodies, failed to apply proper
standards of monitoring and supervision.
- Joined
- Jan 11, 2005
- Messages
- 111,388
Chapter 2: Executive summary
11
2.25 Following further testing in 2013, Arconic decided that Reynobond 55 PE would be certified
as Class E only, whether used in riveted or cassette form. However, it did not pass that
information to its customers in the UK or to the BBA. That was not an oversight. It reflected
a deliberate strategy to continue selling Reynobond 55 PE in the UK based on a statement
about its fire performance that it knew to be false.
2.26 In December 2014 the French testing house Centre Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment
(CSTB) classified the panels in riveted form as Class C and the panels in cassette form as
Class E. However, Arconic failed to inform the BBA of those revised classifications.
2.27 Although Reynobond 55 PE required some degree of fabrication and could not be used
in the form in which it left the factory, Arconic persuaded the BBA to issue a certificate
that drew no distinction between the different forms of fixing. It concealed important
information from the BBA, in particular the test data relating to the product in cassette
form, that showed that it performed much worse than in riveted form. It caused the BBA to
make statements in the certificate that Arconic knew to be false and misleading.
Celotex
2.28 Celotex manufactured RS5000, a combustible polyisocyanurate foam insulation. In an
attempt to break into the market for insulation suitable for use on high-rise buildings,
created and then dominated by Kingspan K15, Celotex embarked on a dishonest scheme to
mislead its customers and the wider market.3
2.29 With the complicity of BRE, in May 2014 Celotex tested in accordance with BS 8414 a
system incorporating RS5000 that contained two sets of fire-resistant magnesium oxide
boards placed in critical positions to ensure that it passed. It then obtained from BRE a test
report that omitted any reference to the magnesium oxide boards, thereby rendering it
materially incomplete and misleading.
2.30 Celotex then marketed RS5000 as “the first PIR board to successfully test to BS 8414”,
and as “acceptable for use in buildings above 18 metres in height”. However, the test on
which Celotex relied in support of that claim had been manipulated as we have described
above, a fact that Celotex did not disclose in its marketing literature. Moreover, BS 8414 is a
system test and does not involve the testing or classification of individual products. Celotex
deliberately tucked that information away in the small print of its marketing literature.
2.31 RS5000 had previously been marketed as FR5000. From 2011 it had been sold as having
Class 0 fire performance “throughout”, a claim which was false and misleading. Celotex
presented RS5000 to Harley as suitable and safe for use on Grenfell Tower, although it knew
that was not the case.
11
2.25 Following further testing in 2013, Arconic decided that Reynobond 55 PE would be certified
as Class E only, whether used in riveted or cassette form. However, it did not pass that
information to its customers in the UK or to the BBA. That was not an oversight. It reflected
a deliberate strategy to continue selling Reynobond 55 PE in the UK based on a statement
about its fire performance that it knew to be false.
2.26 In December 2014 the French testing house Centre Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment
(CSTB) classified the panels in riveted form as Class C and the panels in cassette form as
Class E. However, Arconic failed to inform the BBA of those revised classifications.
2.27 Although Reynobond 55 PE required some degree of fabrication and could not be used
in the form in which it left the factory, Arconic persuaded the BBA to issue a certificate
that drew no distinction between the different forms of fixing. It concealed important
information from the BBA, in particular the test data relating to the product in cassette
form, that showed that it performed much worse than in riveted form. It caused the BBA to
make statements in the certificate that Arconic knew to be false and misleading.
Celotex
2.28 Celotex manufactured RS5000, a combustible polyisocyanurate foam insulation. In an
attempt to break into the market for insulation suitable for use on high-rise buildings,
created and then dominated by Kingspan K15, Celotex embarked on a dishonest scheme to
mislead its customers and the wider market.3
2.29 With the complicity of BRE, in May 2014 Celotex tested in accordance with BS 8414 a
system incorporating RS5000 that contained two sets of fire-resistant magnesium oxide
boards placed in critical positions to ensure that it passed. It then obtained from BRE a test
report that omitted any reference to the magnesium oxide boards, thereby rendering it
materially incomplete and misleading.
2.30 Celotex then marketed RS5000 as “the first PIR board to successfully test to BS 8414”,
and as “acceptable for use in buildings above 18 metres in height”. However, the test on
which Celotex relied in support of that claim had been manipulated as we have described
above, a fact that Celotex did not disclose in its marketing literature. Moreover, BS 8414 is a
system test and does not involve the testing or classification of individual products. Celotex
deliberately tucked that information away in the small print of its marketing literature.
2.31 RS5000 had previously been marketed as FR5000. From 2011 it had been sold as having
Class 0 fire performance “throughout”, a claim which was false and misleading. Celotex
presented RS5000 to Harley as suitable and safe for use on Grenfell Tower, although it knew
that was not the case.
Some summaries of the report - looks like it is hitting hard:
www.theguardian.com
www.theguardian.com
Grenfell report blames decades of government failure and ‘systematic dishonesty’ of companies
Verdict of seven-year inquiry into disaster that killed 72 people apportions responsibility widely
Grenfell Tower fire report: who was at fault and what was landlord’s role?
Key takeaways from public inquiry into 2017 London disaster as 1,700-page final report is published
- Joined
- Jan 11, 2005
- Messages
- 111,388
Scapegoats are already being prepared. Will be interesting to see who throws who under the bus.
northender0602
Patron
Celotex had a parent company of Saint Gobain, which is French, does some of the blame lie with them? Or will it fall totally to Celotex? Saint gobain off loaded 75% of Celotex last year. Some folk should be doing jail time, without a doubt.
unconvinced
Patron